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Dikai	  Emporikai:	  	  A	  Response	  to	  Alberto	  Maffi	  
Mark	  J.	  Sundahl	  
	   Prof.	   Maffi	   has	   taken	   up	   a	   topic	   that	   unfolds	   like	   complex	   origami	   to	   reveal	   a	  multitude	  of	  questions.	   	  The	  topic	  of	  dikai	  emporikai	   is	  a	  very	  narrow	  issue,	  but	  is	  a	  topic	  that	  contains	  mysteries	  of	  procedure	  and	  substance,	  as	  well	  as	  raising	  public	  policy	  issues	  that	  are	  critical	  to	  the	  economic	  power	  of	  Athens.	  	  	  So	   what	   value	   can	   I	   add	   to	   this	   discussion?	   	   I	   will	   attempt	   to	   provide	   an	  interdisciplinary	   perspective	   that	   springs	   from	  my	   training	   as	   a	   lawyer	   and	  my	  work	   in	  other	  ancient	  legal	  systems,	  such	  as	  Islamic	  law.	  	  I	  will	  certainly	  not	  neglect	  the	  Greek	  text,	  but	  my	   comments	  will	   largely	   come	   from	  my	  work	   in	   comparative	   law	   and	   the	  modern	  practicalities	  of	  commercial	  practice	  (the	  underlying	  principles	  of	  which	  do	  not	  differ	  much	  from	   the	   ancient	   practicalities).	   	   Of	   course,	   I	   will	   do	   so	   fully	   aware	   of	   the	   dangers	   of	  projecting	  modern	  practice	  and	  perceptions	  onto	  ancient	  society.	  	  My	  time	  is	  limited	  and	  so	  my	   comments	   must	   be	   as	   well.	   	   I	   will	   address	   four	   issues.	   	   While	   the	   first	   part	   of	   my	  response	   is	   a	   direct	   reaction	   to	   Prof.	  Maffi's	   paper,	   the	   remaining	   parts	  will	   slowly	   turn	  toward	  my	  own	  particular	   interests	   regarding	  dikai	  emporikai.	   	  Here	  are	   the	   issues	   I	  will	  address:	  
1. Why	  did	  Athens	  create	  a	  special	  commercial	  court?	  
2. Why	  was	  a	  written	  contract	  a	  requirement	  of	  the	  commercial	  court's	  jurisdiction?	  




I	  will	   first	  take	  up	  the	  general	  concept	  of	  commercial	  courts.	   	  Prof.	  Maffi	  opens	  his	  paper	  with	   the	  question	  of	  why	  a	   commercial	   action	  was	  created	   in	  Athens.	   	  My	  starting	  point	  here	  will	  be	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  from	  a	  modern	  perspective.	  	  Commercial	  courts	  are	  not	  unique	   to	  ancient	  Athens.	   	  They	  exist	   today	   in	  many,	   if	  not	  all,	  of	   the	   fifty	  United	  States.	   	   The	   rationale	   for	   creating	   a	   special	   court	   for	   commercial	   matters	   is	   generally	  described	  as	  two-­‐pronged.	  	  First,	  the	  speed	  of	  the	  proceedings	  benefits	  parties	  who	  need	  to	  continue	  with	  their	  business.	   	  Second,	  the	  expertise	  of	   judges	  who	  hear	  commercial	  cases	  repeatedly	  results	  in	  a	  more	  consistent	  and	  fair	  application	  of	  the	  law.	   	  These	  reasons	  for	  creating	   dikai	   emporikai	  have	   been	   raised	   by	   commentators	   repeatedly	   and	   evidence	   in	  support	  of	  these	  reasons	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  ancient	  texts.	  	  However,	  an	  additional	  motive	  for	   creating	   this	   special	   case	   existed	   in	   Athens:	   the	   need	   to	   open	   the	   courts	   to	   foreign	  traders.	   	   This	   is	   not	   an	   issue	   in	   U.S.	   or	   European	   courts	   where	   foreign	   parties	   can	   sue	  (provided	  certain	  minimal	  jurisdictional	  requirements	  are	  met).	  Prof.	  Maffi	  makes	  the	  daring	  suggestion	  that	  speed	  was	  not	  a	  goal	  of	  dikai	  emporikai.	  	  He	  supports	  this	  conclusion	  by	  pointing,	  among	  other	  things,	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  requirement	  to	  use	  an	  arbitrator	  to	  settle	  the	  dispute	  and	  the	  length	  of	  the	  investigations	  that	  would	  be	  undertaken	   by	   the	   Thesmothetai.	   	   If	   we	   accept	   this	   conclusion,	   why	   then	   was	   the	  commercial	  court	  created?	  	  At	  this	  point,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  briefly	  take	  up	  a	  point	  that	  Prof.	  Maffi	  promises	  not	  to	  address,	  but	  still	  makes	  his	  opinion	  clear.	   	  The	  question	   is	   the	  meaning	  of	  dikai	  emmenoi,	  which	  can	  be	  translated	  either	  as	  "suits	  brought	  on	  a	  monthly	  basis"	  or	  "suits	  that	  must	  be	  decided	  within	  a	  month."	  	  Most	  famously,	  Edward	  Cohen	  argues	  for	  the	  first	  definition	  (that	  
lexeis,	   or	   "complaints",	   can	   only	   be	   lodged	   one	   day	   every	  month	   and	   that	   these	   charges	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would	   be	   accepted	   during	   the	  winter).	   	   Prof.	  Maffi	   disagrees.	   	   He	   sees	   that	   the	   pressing	  need	  of	  merchants	  was	  to	  have	  their	  business	  disputes	  resolved	  immediately	  so	  that	  they	  can	  be	  made	  whole	  again	  and	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  to	  continue	  their	  business	  in	  full	  force.	  	  I	  agree	  with	  this	  interpretation	  since	  it	  is	  the	  only	  interpretation	  that	  makes	  any	  sense	  from	  a	   practical	   perspective.	   	   We	   are	   not	   talking	   about	   multi-­‐national	   corporations	   with	  resources	  that	  allow	  them	  to	  wait	  for	  redress.	   	  Small	  businesses	  can	  be	  ruined	  by	  a	  single	  dispute	  and	  need	  redress	  quickly	  in	  order	  to	  survive	  (and	  hopefully	  continue	  to	  trade	  while	  the	  summer	  weather	  is	  still	  conducive	  to	  sailing).	   	   I	  have	  meditated	  for	  some	  time	  on	  the	  following	  question:	   	  How	  would	   it	  benefit	  merchants	  to	  have	  their	  complaints	  received	  one	  
day	  a	  month	  during	  the	  winter	  long	  after	  the	  need	  for	  redress	  arises?	   	   I	  cannot	  think	  of	  any	  benefit,	  but	  I	  welcome	  any	  light	  that	  my	  fellow	  participants	  can	  shed	  on	  this.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  we	  accept	  that	  dikai	  emmenoi	  means	  that	  the	  case	  will	  be	  resolved	  within	  a	  month	  -­‐	  just	   as	   the	  menstrual	   cycle	   (menses	   emmenoi)	   is	   finished	  within	   a	  month	   -­‐	   then	  we	   can	  argue	  that	  speed	  was	  a	  motivation	  for	  creating	  the	  special	  court.	  	  	  Let’s	  turn	  now	  to	  another	  potential	  motivation	  for	  creating	  a	  commercial	  court.	  	  Was	  a	   special	   commercial	   court	   created	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   expertise	   regarding	   commercial	  matters?	  	  If	  we	  accept	  Prof.	  Maffi's	  point	  that	  jurors	  were	  unlikely	  to	  have	  been	  drawn	  from	  a	  special	  class	  of	  merchants,	  then	  such	  expertise	  in	  the	  court	  was	  unlikely.	  	  	  If	  neither	  speed	  nor	  expertise	  motivated	  the	  creation	  of	  commercial	  courts,	  we	  are	  left	   with	   the	   need	   to	   create	   a	   special	   court	   to	   allow	   complaints	   from	   foreigners.	   	  While	  
metics	  appeared	  to	  have	  the	  right	  to	  pursue	  private	  actions	  in	  Athenian	  courts	  (Todd:	  194),	  non-­‐metic	   foreigners	   did	   not.	   	   However,	  dikai	   emporikai	  could	   be	   initiated	   by	   non-­‐metic	  foreigners.	   	   In	  fact,	  both	  parties	  could	  be	  foreigners.	   	  But	  why	  would	  Athens	  want	  to	  give	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foreigners	  the	  right	  to	  use	  their	  courts	  (and	  to	  sue	  Athenian	  citizens)?	  For	  the	  same	  reason	  that	   modern	   states	   provide	   investor-­‐friendly	   laws,	   low	   taxes,	   lax	   regulations,	   and	   other	  enticements	   to	   businesses.	   	   In	   order	   to	   attract	   traders	   and	   businesses	   to	   their	   economy.	  	  Merely	   the	   right	   to	   sue	   (whether	   or	  not	   it	  was	   speedy	  or	  decided	  with	   expertise)	  would	  have	  been	  a	  reason	  to	  do	  business	  in	  Athens.	  	  Cohen	  argues	  (or	  argued	  some	  42	  years	  ago)	  that	  most	  merchants	   resided	   in	   Athens	   and	   that	   no	   special	   court	  was	   needed	   to	   resolve	  disputes	   involving	   a	   foreigner.	   	   With	   all	   due	   respect	   (Dr.	   Cohen’s	   books	   are	   among	   my	  favorites),	  this	  I	  find	  hard	  to	  believe.	  	  Written	   contracts	   are	   one	   of	   the	   jurisdictional	   requirements	   of	   the	   commercial	  courts.	  	  Why	  is	  this	  so?	  	  Cohen	  argues	  that	  a	  written	  contract	  alleviates	  the	  concern	  about	  choice	  of	  law.	  	  If	  the	  contract	  states	  the	  agreement	  clearly,	  the	  jury	  need	  not	  be	  concerned	  with	  whether	  Athenian	  practice	  and	   law	  or	   that	  of	  another	  state	  governs	  the	  transaction.	  	  This	   makes	   perfect	   sense	   and	   I	   believe	   that	   written	   agreements	   would	   make	   the	   jury’s	  decision	   easier.	   	   But	   are	   there	   any	  other	   reasons	   for	   requiring	  written	   contracts?	   	  Might	  there	  be	  other	  benefits	  of	  requiring	  written	  agreements?	  	  I	  can	  think	  of	  at	  least	  two.	  	  First,	  like	  the	  common	  law	  Statute	  of	  Frauds	  (which	  exists	  still	   in	  the	  U.S.	   for	  the	  sale	  of	  goods,	  but	  has	  been	  qualified	  virtually	  out	  of	  existence	  in	  Great	  Britain	  and,	  as	  I	  understand,	  only	  exists	   for	   the	   sale	   of	   real	   property),	   the	   requirement	   for	   a	   written	   agreement	   protects	  against	   fraud.	   	  That	   is,	   requiring	   the	   showing	  of	   a	  written	  agreement	  prevents	  one	  party	  from	   wrongfully	   accusing	   another	   party	   of	   having	   entered	   into	   a	   contract.	   	   This	  requirement	   has	   fallen	   so	   far	   from	   common	   use	   in	   the	   modern	   world	   that	   I	   wonder	  whether	  it	  was	  a	  factor	  in	  ancient	  Athens.	  	  However,	  I	  do	  believe	  that	  written	  agreements	  assist	  with	  resolving	  disputes.	   	   If	   the	  parties	  agreed	  on	  certain	  provisions	   in	  writing,	   it	   is	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much	   easier	   for	   a	   court	   to	   reach	   a	   decision.	   	   The	   Athenian	   law	   granting	   supremacy	   to	  written	  contracts	  over	  law	  only	  adds	  to	  the	  benefits	  of	  entering	  into	  a	  written	  agreement.	  	  	  	  The	   requirement	   of	   written	   agreements	   would	   have	   the	   additional	   benefit	   of	  increasing	   the	   practice	   of	   using	   written	   agreements	   in	   the	   Mediterranean.	   	   If	   a	   trader	  wanted	   swift	   justice	   in	  Athens,	   a	  written	  agreement	  was	  necessary.	   	  Written	  agreements	  were	  likely	  helpful	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  Mediterranean	  world	  where	  traders	  did	  business.	  	   Now	  I	  will	  take	  some	  liberties	  by	  pursuing	  an	  issue	  that	  is	  suggested	  by	  Prof.	  Maffi’s	  paper,	  but	  only	  in	  the	  most	  subtle	  way.	  	  That	  is,	  this	  most	  peculiar	  rule	  that	  all	  lenders	  will	  suffer	   total	   financial	   devastation	   if	   a	   shipwreck	   occurs.	   	   This	   is	   peculiar	   from	   a	  Western	  modern	  perspective	  because	  lenders	  excuse	  payment	  from	  borrowers	  only	  under	  the	  most	  extreme	  and	  uncontrollable	  circumstances.	  	  And	  they	  don’t	  always	  do	  that.	  	  To	  wit,	  here	  is	  a	  
force	  majeure	  clause	  from	  a	  modern	  sales	  agreement:	  
Seller	   shall	   not	   be	   liable	   in	   damages	   for	   any	   delay	   or	   default	   in	   performing	  
hereunder	   if	   such	   de-­‐lay	   or	   default	   is	   caused	   by	   conditions	   beyond	   its	  
reasonable	  control	  including,	  but	  not	  limited	  to,	  Acts	  of	  God,	  natural	  disasters,	  
government	   restrictions	   (including,	   but	   not	   limited	   to,	   the	   denial	   or	  
cancellation	  of	  any	  kimport	  or	  export	  licenses),	  wars,	  insurrections,	  piracy,	  and	  
terrorism.	   	   This	   clause	   shall	   in	   no	   way	   excuse	   the	   buyer	   from	   any	   payment	  
obligations.	  Notice	  that	  it	  is	  only	  the	  seller	  that	  will	  not	  be	  liable	  if	  conditions	  for	  performance	  become	  impossible.	  	  The	  buyer	  still	  has	  to	  pay	  under	  any	  circumstances.	  	  But	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case	  in	  Athens.	  	  The	  lender	  would	  share	  this	  risk	  and	  sacrifice	  all	  profit	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  return	  of	  the	  capital	  investment)	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  shipwreck.	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Why	  is	  this	  the	  case?	  	  Why	  would	  a	  creditor	  want	  to	  share	  in	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  borrower?	  	  And	  the	   situation	   grows	   more	   drastic.	   	   Not	   only	   does	   the	   creditor	   share	   in	   the	   risk	   of	   the	  borrower	  not	  paying	  at	  all	  in	  the	  case	  of	  shipwreck.	  	  The	  creditor	  also	  accepts	  the	  risk	  that	  the	  borrower	  pays	   late.	   	   The	   lender	  would	   share	   the	   risk	   of	   late	  payment	   (i.e.	   the	   credit	  risk)	  because	  tokos	  was	  not	  based	  on	  time,	  but	  was	  a	  set	  percentage	  of	  the	  loan	  (or	  “yield”)	  regardless	  of	  how	  long	  it	  would	  take	  the	  borrower	  to	  repay.	  So	  we	   have	   the	   creditor	   sharing	   the	   risk	   in	  multiple	  ways.	   	   This	   is	   very	   different	  from	   modern	   western	   practices,	   but	   it	   is	   very	   similar	   to	   medieval	   and	   modern	   Islamic	  financial	   practices.	   	   Islamic	   law	   despises	   interest	   and	   financial	   devices	   for	   funding	  businesses	   require	   the	   lender	   to	   share	   the	   risk	  of	   the	   transaction	  by,	   for	  example,	   taking	  equity	  in	  the	  company	  that	  is	  being	  financed.	  	  Why	  do	  we	  see	  this	  sharing	  of	  risk	  in	  Islam	  and	  ancient	  Greece?	  	  Is	  it	  a	  moral	  imperative	  to	  not	  place	  the	  risk	  entirely	  on	  the	  borrower?	  	  Or	   does	   it	   serve	   some	   other	   greater	   purpose?	   	   Perhaps	   to	   force	   the	   lenders	   to	   be	  more	  prudent	   in	   selecting	   their	   investments?	   	   An	   Athenian	   banker	   would	   never	   invest	   in	   a	  trading	  expedition	  that	  involved	  a	  rotting	  boat	  asail	  in	  the	  storming	  season.	  	  Money	  would	  only	  be	  spent	  where	  the	  risk	  of	  shipwreck	  or	  late	  payment	  was	  low.	  	  This	  would	  encourage	  wise	  investments	  and	  the	  most	  efficient	  placement	  of	  capital.	  	   	  	  
